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NOTE
EXHAUSTED AND CONFUSED:
HOW FRY COMPLICATED
OBTAINING RELIEF FOR
DISABLED STUDENTS
CHRIS RICIGLIANO*
INTRODUCTION
On November 17, 1989, Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa declared that
Senate Bill 1824 “will go a long way toward ensuring that children with
disabilities grow up to meet their full potential as productive citizens.”1
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) was signed
into law by President George H.W. Bush on October 30, 1990.2
Congress sought to grant students with disabilities equal access to a
public education by increasing federal funding for specialized programs
and allowing the states and local school boards to draw individualized
programs to meet their specific student needs. IDEA was the successor
to the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975.3 One of
the central tenets of the special education legislation is the guarantee
of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for disabled students.4
Since the 1970s, Congress has enacted numerous pieces of legislation to
promote equality for the disabled, including the Rehabilitation Act5

*
J.D., Duke Law School, 2021. B.A., University of Maryland, College Park, 2018. Incredibly
thankful for the support of Professor Jane Wettach in crafting this piece from the beginning and
my peers in the editing and improving process. I am blessed by the eternal love and support of
my family, who inspired the topic of this Note.
1. 135 CONG. REC. 29, 833 (1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
2. Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990).
3. 135 CONG. REC. 29, 832–33 (1989) (explaining that IDEA is a reauthorization and
expansion of programs that date back to the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975).
4. Angelika Orletsky Doebler, There is No Such Thing as a Free Appropriate Public
Education, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 775, 776–77 (2019).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 701(b) (2018) (defining the purpose of the amendments to the Rehabilitation
Act).
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and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).6 The Rehabilitation
Act was passed in order to “maximize opportunities for individuals
with disabilities” by providing support and economic opportunities.7
The ADA focuses generally on eliminating “discrimination faced dayto-day by people with disabilities.”8 While the ADA and Rehabilitation
Act focus more generally on discrimination, IDEA is more narrowly
concerned with education.
In the thirty years following the passage of IDEA, the Supreme
Court has been asked to weigh in on what services schools are required
to provide students with disabilities and how parents and guardians can
seek relief when those services are not made available.9 Many of these
decisions addressed procedural issues, shedding light on when certain
claims can be raised in court on behalf of children with disabilities, what
relief may be provided, and under what law a claim may arise. One such
case is the 2017 decision Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools.10 In Fry,
the Court held that when a plaintiff alleges that she has been denied
educational services in violation of her statutory right to a free and
appropriate public education (or FAPE), the complaint arises under
IDEA, and parents11 must exhaust administrative remedies before
seeking relief in federal court.12 However, if claims are not based on the
denial of a FAPE, then the claim can be brought under statutes like the
Rehabilitation Act or the ADA, and plaintiff’s parents may bypass any
administrative proceedings.13 To assess whether there is a denial of a
FAPE, the Court has not articulated a firm test, instead suggesting
“clue[s]” that may be used to determine the gravamen, or crux, of the
complaint.14
Some scholars considered Fry a victory for parents of disabled
students, as it provided them with a clear path to bring cases of
discrimination to court without being dragged through a long

6. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2018) (defining the purpose of the ADA).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 701(B)(2) (2018).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(B)(4) (2018).
9. See Doebler, supra note 4, at 779–83 (explaining some of the Court’s precedents
interpreting FAPE).
10. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017).
11. Throughout this note I say use the term “parents” to describe who is bringing claims on
behalf of disabled students. This is done for consistency and clarity; of course, there are countless
others beyond parents that care for and represent disabled children.
12. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 752.
13. Id. at 747.
14. Id.
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administrative process under IDEA.15 But this optimism proved
shortsighted: since Fry, appellate courts have struggled to clearly and
consistently identify the elements of a FAPE claim and whether IDEA
imposes an exhaustion requirement on the plaintiff.16 Moreover, as
noted in Fry, some cases may implicate multiple sources of law, such as
IDEA, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act, which further complicates
the question of when the exhaustion requirement applies.17 The
procedural hurdles and statutory ambiguities have frustrated the very
point of IDEA, thereby depriving the disabled of the services they need
to become productive members of society.
This Note explores how Fry fits into the broader picture of special
education law, how Circuit Courts have applied the Fry doctrine, and
offers solutions to streamline the procedures to bring a claim under
IDEA. Part I will explore a limited history of special education cases,
highlighting the foundations and contours of the education entitled to
students with disabilities. Part II will explain the Fry decision, and show
that the Court has failed to provided clear guidance to plaintiffs in part
because it has articulated a set of “clues” to be applied as a guiding
framework rather than a test. Part III will then discuss how the Circuits
have interpreted Fry. The Circuits differ on three issues: 1) whether the
clues are a loose frame to follow or a firm test to apply, 2) whether the
clues apply to a complaint as a whole or claim-by-claim within a
complaint, and 3) whether a request for monetary damages exempts a
complaint from exhaustion under IDEA. Part IV will offer solutions to
resolves ambiguities in the clue framework in order to promote
procedural consistency. The Court should articulate its “clue” inquiry
as a firm test with a clear standard that lower courts may readily apply.
It could do this by clarifying that the clues suggested are actually
elements of a test and not guiding principles for lower courts to use at
their discretion. Further, the Court should require lower courts to
apply this new test to the complaint taken as a whole and not claim-byclaim. This would prevent parents from having to maintain separate
litigation tracks simultaneously, and there would be less confusion
regarding whether the complaint is addressing the denial of a FAPE
and requires exhaustion. Additionally, the exhaustion requirement
15. See, e.g., Robert Garda, Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools: Finding a Middle Ground,
46 J.L. & EDUC. 459, 460 (2017) (“This is a significant victory for students and parents that need
immediate and efficient relief from disability discrimination.”).
16. See id. at 467–68 (arguing that not deciding the issue of relief leaves a huge hole, allowing
plaintiffs to sidestep IDEA by requesting relief unavailable under the law).
17. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 756.
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should not apply when the litigant is seeking relief not explicitly offered
by the statutory text, which, in the case of IDEA, does not include
money damages. Although parents could theoretically tack on a request
for damages to avoid exhaustion, judges applying the test would be able
to assess if the complaint is about the denial of a FAPE or some other
statutory right.
While these concrete steps would not resolve all of the problems
facing IDEA exhaustion jurisprudence, having a standardized and
administrable test would provide clarity to the courts and families
seeking relief for their children. Procedural clarity is essential for timely
access to justice. The need for speedy resolution is particularly acute
for children with disabilities seeking educational rights, who are in
school for a limited time. Clarifying the procedural mechanisms in
special education cases would streamline the process by which parents
help their children with disabilities obtain relief.
I. SELECTED LEGAL HISTORY OF SPECIAL EDUCATION
For much of U.S. history, children with disabilities have been denied
access to public education.18 In many states, schools were allowed to
exclude students whose presence they felt would interfere with the
educational experiences of other students.19 However, after the Court
declared segregation in schools unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of
Education,20 parents of disabled children began to bring suits
challenging the exclusion of their children from public school systems.21
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania22 and
Mills v. Board of Education23 are prominent examples of district court
decisions that enforced special needs students’ rights to an education.
Twenty years after Brown,24 Congress began to take action to

18. Thomas A. Jacobs, Education: Student Rights and Responsibilities, in CHILDREN AND
2 § 9:32, Westlaw (database updated May 2020).
19. Alessandra Perna, Breaking the Cycle of Burdensome and Inefficient Special Education
Costs Facing Local School Districts, 49 NEW ENG. L. REV. 541, 546 (2015).
20. 74 S. Ct. 686, 692 (1954).
21. See id. at 547 (explaining the impact that Brown had in emboldening parents of disabled
children to bring claims of their own against public schools for the “feeling of inferiority” it
caused).
22. See Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Child. v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258 (E.D. Pa.
1971) (holding that Pennsylvania could not deny mentally disabled children access to a free public
education program).
23. See Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972) (finding that the school
board’s denial of public education to disabled children violated the Due Process Clause).
24. Brown, 74 S. Ct. 686.
THE LAW: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS,

RICIGLIANO_03_04_21_FORMATTED FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

38

3/4/2021 9:33 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 16

ensure that disabled students had access to free public education. The
Education for All Handicapped Children Act was passed in 1975 and
developed much of the current framework for educating disabled
children.25 Congress granted to all children with disabilities a legal right
to a “free appropriate public education,” funded by taxpayer dollars.26
What qualified as a FAPE was determined by state educational
standards.27 Rather than setting a uniform standard for what each
child’s education should look like, Congress instead developed the
Individualized Education Program (IEP) requirement, which
mandates that a team of family and educators develop an education
plan tailored to the child’s particular needs.28 The IEP sets individual
goals and identifies the special education services designed to assist the
student and realize her right to a FAPE.29 Legislation does not set a
standard for what education programs are necessary to constitute a
FAPE and instead provides for procedural mechanisms to ensure a
FAPE is provided.30 Congress required the States to provide an
administrative avenue for parents to bring challenges, which must
include notice, due process, and an opportunity to mediate.31 How a
parent exhausts administrative remedies is dependent on the state
procedure.
Congress further addressed issues facing disabled Americans
(though not in the context of education) when it passed the
Rehabilitation Act in 1973, which announced that any state or federal
agency receiving federal money could not discriminate in the provision
of services to the disabled.32 In 1990, the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) banned discrimination on the basis of disability in
employment and in places of public accommodation.33
While these laws significantly advanced the interests of disabled
children, large gaps remained. Much of the statutory language granting
25. Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped Act: A Study
in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 349, 350–51 (1990).
26. See Perna, supra note 19, at 548 (citing Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Child., 343 F. Supp. at
285, and asserting that Congress acted after a wave of court decisions had affirmed the right of
each child to an education).
27. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(A)-(D) (2018).
28. Id. § 1414.
29. See id. (outlining generally the terms of an IEP).
30. See id. § 1415(A) (requiring that states maintain procedures to ensure that a free
appropriate public education is guaranteed).
31. Id. § 1415(b).
32. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 749 (2017).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2018) (identifying the purpose of the ADA as demanding
the elimination of discrimination against disabled persons).
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rights to disabled Americans was vague and established broad goals
without specifying exactly what disabled services in education should
look like. Thus, when asked to determine to what educational services
disabled students were entitled, the Supreme Court had little concrete
instruction to work with.
Arguably, Board of Education v. Rowley34 is the seminal case on
what constitutes a FAPE. In Rowley, Amy Rowley sued her school for
failing to provide her with a sign language interpreter.35 After going
through the administrative process of challenging her IEP, Rowley
brought suit in federal court, claiming that she was denied a FAPE.36
The Court, examining the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act, determined that Congress sought only to “open the door” to
education for disabled students and did not guarantee them any level
of education.37 Moreover, the Court rejected that the Act mandated an
“equal” education for disabled students because this would be “an
entirely unworkable framework.”38 Lastly, the Court held that lower
courts should ask whether a district complying with the Act had
developed a program “reasonably calculated to enable the [disabled]
child to receive educational benefits . . . .”39 In 2017, the Court had the
opportunity to define the level of educational progress sufficient to
satisfy the Rowley requirements. In Endrew F. v. Douglas County
School District, the family of a child with autism brought a suit alleging
that his right to a FAPE had been violated.40 The plaintiff argued for a
new standard, one based on the likelihood of the child’s academic
success and implored the Court to abandon the vague Rowley
requirements.41 The Court rejected the proposal and reaffirmed
Rowley’s “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
educational benefits” standard.42 However, the Court also held that a
mere de minimis amount of progress was not enough to qualify as a
FAPE43: If students are only expected to make de minimis progress
each year, they “can hardly be said to have been offered an education

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

458 U.S. 176 (1982).
Id. at 185.
Id. at 184–85.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 206–07.
137 S. Ct. 988, 995 (2017).
Id. at 991, 1001.
Id. at 1001.
Id. at 1000–01.
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at all.”44
In addition to defining the substantive elements of a FAPE, the
Court has also prescribed the procedural requirements of a FAPE—in
other words, what procedures schools must comply with to fulfill their
statutory obligations. In Honig v. Doe, two disabled students challenged
the terms of their IEPs.45 The Court noted that the IEP is the
“centerpiece of the statute’s education delivery system” and is the
“vehicle” by which students receive a FAPE.46 The Court also
maintained that parents may seek review in court when the
administrative review process proves “unsatisfactory.”47
Though the Court further defined what qualifies as a FAPE,
questions remained as to which anti-discrimination statute parents
were procedurally required to use to pursue FAPE claims. Prior to the
passage of IDEA, in Smith v. Robinson, a student with cerebral palsy
brought suit under the Education for the Handicapped Children Act
(the predecessor to IDEA), alleging that his due process and FAPE
rights were violated because he could no longer attend a day program
at a hospital due to a lack of funding.48 The Court rejected the due
process claim, holding that Congress intended for the Education for the
Handicapped Children Act to be the exclusive means of challenging
the adequacy of disabled children’s education.49 In response to
questions of which statute applies in special education cases, Congress
amended IDEA to add an exhaustion requirement.50 This provided that
claims may be brought in federal court under the ADA or like laws
unless the claimant is seeking relief under IDEA, in which case
administrative remedies must be first exhausted.51
In short, before Fry, it was settled that every disabled child was
entitled to a FAPE.52 To satisfy that requirement, a school’s efforts to
provide such education needed only be “reasonable”—a less than
exacting standard. The primary means of receiving this FAPE was the
IEP. After Congress amended IDEA, parents challenging the adequacy
of their child’s education had to exhaust administrative remedies as
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 1001.
484 U.S. 305, 313–14 (1988).
Id. at 311.
Id. at 312.
468 U.S. 992, 995 (1984).
Id. at 1009, 1013.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2018).
Id.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2018).
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specified by the state, meeting the minimum procedural bar set by
statute. But one question remained: How were courts to determine
whether the claim is for the denial of a FAPE, in cases where plaintiff
seeks relief under multiple anti-disability-discrimination statutes?
II. IDEA EXHAUSTION UNDER FRY V. NAPOLEON COMMUNITY
SCHOOLS
Ehlena Fry was born with a severe form of cerebral palsy and
required a service dog to assist her in all life activities.53 When Ehlena
was to begin kindergarten, school officials barred her from using her
service dog at school.54 Fry’s parents filed a complaint with the
Department of Education Office for Civil Rights, alleging that
forbidding Ehlena from bringing her service dog to school violated
Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.55 The
Fry family then brought suit in federal district court, seeking
declaratory relief and monetary damages.56
The district court dismissed the claim on procedural grounds,
holding that the Fry family must exhaust its claim administratively
before bringing suit in federal court because the claim was actually
governed by IDEA.57 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
because “the genesis and manifestations” of the claim were
“educational” in nature and thus arose from the substantive
protections of IDEA as opposed to the ADA and other antidiscrimination statutes.58
The Supreme Court first looked to the text of IDEA to determine
whether the statute imposed an exhaustion requirement, finding that
Section 1415(l) requires that plaintiffs must first exhaust administrative
avenues before bringing suit arising from the set of facts under other
statutes.59 Moreover, the Court reiterated that IDEA codifies the right
to a free appropriate public education and held that the FAPE requires
“‘meaningful’ access to education based on [the child’s] individual
needs.”60 Administrative officials are limited in their remedial powers:
53. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 750–51 (2017).
54. Id. at 751.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 751–52.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2018).
60. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 753–54 (2017) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982)).
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They can only grant relief in furtherance of a FAPE.61 Only those
claims that allege denial of a FAPE are subject to IDEA’s exhaustion
requirement.62
Because the exhaustion requirement is only triggered by IDEA
claims, the Court set out guidelines to determine if the claim alleges
denial of a FAPE and thus originates under IDEA, rather than another
anti-discrimination statute. Per Fry, the court should start by looking at
the complaint.63 The reviewing court should look beyond the face of the
complaint and instead look to the substance of the complaint’s request
to determine which statute’s procedural requirements control.64 To do
this, courts must focus on the “gravamen,” or essence, of the
complaint.65 The Court recognized that there is some overlap in the
substantive protections and remedies available under IDEA, the
Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA which could complicate determining
which statute applies.66 To determine if IDEA applies, and exhaustion
is required, the Court provided two “clues” to discern whether the
gravamen of the complaint is the denial of a FAPE or other noneducation related discrimination. First, could the plaintiff have asserted
the claim against a non-school public facility?67 And second, could an
adult in the school building bring the same claim?68 If both questions
could be answered in the affirmative, then the gravamen of the
complaint is not the denial of a FAPE, and thus is not an IDEA claim,
which only applies to children in schools.69 Further, the Court clarified
that the history of the pleadings may be useful: If the claim was
originally brought under IDEA rather than the ADA, then the claim
may concern the denial of a FAPE.70 In Ehlena Fry’s case, the Court
held that, because she could have brought a similar claim against a
public library and an adult denied the use of a service animal could
have brought the claim, the gravamen of the suit was not the denial of
a FAPE.71
In his concurrence, Justice Alito stressed that these “clues” may be
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 754.
Id. at 754–55.
Id. at 755.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 756.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 757.
Id. at 758.
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confusing for lower courts to apply because they only work if there is
no overlap in the relief available under the sibling statutes.72 Moreover,
Alito argued that the procedural history of a parent’s complaint is not
particularly telling, given that parents may decide to change strategy if
advised by counsel that the relief they seek is available elsewhere.73
For lower courts, the Fry decision proved downright confusing. The
statute mandates that IDEA claims be exhausted administratively
before they can be pursued in another forum.74 Yet, as Justice Alito
notes, there is not always a clean distinction between relief allowed
under IDEA and other related statutes, like the ADA. Some remedies,
like monetary relief, are available under IDEA’s sister statutes but are
unavailable under IDEA—adding to the confusion. Despite the
potential overlap in remedies, IDEA is unique in its exhaustion
requirement.75 But many of the underlying substantive claims may be
pursued under IDEA, the ADA, or the Rehabilitation Act. Further
complicating the inquiry is the fact that complaints may include various
claims, some for the denial of a FAPE under IDEA and others for
discrimination against a disabled child more generally. The Fry test
does not make parsing these claims easy: indeed, parents litigating
these claims would have to seek remedy for both claims in separate
proceedings—creating duplicative suits. Furthermore, by framing these
tests as mere “clues” for determining the gravamen of the complaint,
the Court provided no real guidance on whether lower courts should
analyze each claim separately or view the complaint as a whole. 76
For example, if a deaf student is denied the use of a translator to
help communicate Sign Language in school, she may raise a number of
different claims. The student may bring a claim under IDEA because
the lack of an interpreter could cause the child to struggle in school,
thereby denying her a FAPE. However, relief may also be available
under Title II of the ADA for discrimination on the basis of disability.
Applying Fry’s “clue” framework, the student may have the same claim
against another public facility and an adult could bring the same or
similar claim. One judge rigidly applying the clues may allow a claim
under the ADA and not require exhaustion; yet another judge, looking
72. Id. at 759 (Alito, J., concurring).
73. Id.
74. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2018) (articulating the requirement that administrative remedies
must be sought before a lawsuit can be filed).
75. Id.
76. The Court also remained silent on the issue of monetary damages. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 752
n.4.
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at the same complaint, might apply the clues less stringently and
determine that the complaint as a whole is seeking to restore the child’s
educational services, thus requiring exhaustion under IDEA.
Therefore, the framework established in Fry may lead to inconsistent
results.
Moreover, it is unclear from the Court’s analysis whether seeking
other relief in addition to a FAPE exempts the complaint from IDEA’s
exhaustion requirement. The Court has consistently provided that an
IDEA hearing officer may only grant relief under IDEA, and the only
relief available is the restitution of the child’s FAPE.77 If a family asks
for monetary damages, as in Fry, they must look elsewhere—IDEA
gives them no such remedy.
The clues used to determine the crux of the complaint may help a
court decide whether a claimant is seeking relief for denial of an
educational benefit or discrimination more broadly.78 However, this
potential benefit to courts may be not be felt by families in the absence
of a concrete standard. The clue framework could prove more
confusing than helpful when statutes overlap and the relief being
sought may be in part to provide an adequate education and in part to
alleviate discrimination.
Justice Alito identified major questions regarding the approach
adopted by the Fry Court. However, he did not go far enough in stating
the potential consequences of the framework established in Fry.
Beyond the articulated holes the Court left in both the exhaustion
framework and the accompanying clues, the Fry opinion does little to
make the reality easier for the parents bringing challenges.79 This
resulting uncertainty means that parents may have claims pending in
parallel tracks, simultaneously litigating under IDEA administrative
structure and in federal court under the ADA. Under the Court’s
current approach, there is no clarity as to which claims can proceed.
Litigating in parallel tracks might be too difficult and expensive for
parents to manage. Parents and guardians aim to see their student
attain a good education, receive the services he needs to succeed, and
77. Id. at 755.
78. See Garda, supra note 15, at 471 (arguing that Fry eliminated the ability to avoid
exhaustion by artful pleading).
79. Ruth Colker suggests that parents may be inclined to abandon challenges under IDEA
and instead ask for services available under the Rehabilitation Act in order to access federal
courts and get faster results. See Ruth Colker, Did the Fry Decision Under the IDEA Overturn
Rowley?, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 443, 449–50 (2017) (illustrating how an approach by a family pre-Fry
in avoiding claims based in education would be an appropriate strategy to finding relief after Fry).
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avoid discrimination. Yet, the framework adopted by the Court may
instead cause parents to abandon educational claims altogether, so that
they may skirt the exhaustion process and receive faster relief.
Criticism aside, the Fry decision should be noted for allowing claims
that do not allege a denial of a FAPE to bypass IDEA entirely.
However, in the process, the Court created more confusion regarding
which claims of discrimination are actually subject to exhaustion.
III. SPLINTERED APPLICATION OF FRY ACROSS THE CIRCUITS
Perhaps unsurprisingly, lower courts have not applied Fry
uniformly. Judges have struggled to determine how much weight to give
the “clues” in their analysis and how to characterize the relief being
sought. As Justice Alito warned, the clues are clear if there is no overlap
in the coverage of statutes such as IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, and
the ADA.80 However, if a claim could be brought under any of the
relevant anti-discrimination statutes, then the clues are wholly
unilluminating.81
The circuits have split on how to 1) apply the clues and 2) determine
what relief is being sought. On the issue of using the “clues” to
determine the gravamen of the complaint, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have applied the clues as if they were a
mandatory test.82 The First, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, as well
as district courts in the Second and D.C. Circuits, have instead used the
clues as less of a test and more of a guide.83 With respect to the second
inquiry, the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have looked claimby-claim to see if exhaustion is required for each claim.84 The First,
Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits, in contrast, examine the nature of
the complaint as a whole.85
Open questions remain as to whether a claim is governed by IDEA
when plaintiffs seek relief unavailable under the statute, such as

80. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 759 (Alito, J, concurring).
81. Id.
82. See Maureen A. MacFarlane, In Search of the Meaning of an “Appropriate Education”:
Ponderings on the Fry and Endrew Decisions, 46 J.L & EDUC. 539, 549–52 (exploring some of the
ways in which the circuits have adopted and applied Fry; while not a complete identification of
up to date circuit cases, it roughly provides an overview into how the issues of Fry have been
framed).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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monetary damages along with services to ensure a FAPE.86 Due to the
recency of the Fry decision, there is not an extensive record of circuit
level decisions applying Fry.
A. What to make of the clues?
One split is what weight to give the clues in determining the
gravamen of a complaint. The First Circuit in Doucette v. Georgetown
Public Schools,87 Third Circuit in Wellman v. Butler Area School
District,88 Ninth Circuit in Paul G. v. Monterey Peninsula Unified School
District,89 and Eleventh Circuit in J.S. v. Houston County Board of
Education90 have decided that the Court intended for the clues to be
used as signposts. District courts in the Second Circuit and the D.C.
Circuit have followed this path.91 The Eleventh Circuit rejected a rigid
application of the Fry clues in Houston County. The case involved an
appeal by a severely disabled student who had been removed from class
and forced to sit in the school weight room, isolated from his
classmates.92 The teacher who had removed the disabled student from
class had allegedly abused him both verbally and physically.93 Upon
learning of the alleged abuse, the student’s parents filed a lawsuit,
alleging violations of the ADA.94 In identifying the gravamen of his
complaint, the court noted that the case did not fit neatly into the Fry
clues, as the child’s punishment removed him from his classroom for
reasons unrelated to his education.95 The student’s parents did not raise
a claim under IDEA.96 The court nevertheless engaged with Fry and
decided that the complaint could have been brought as the denial of a
FAPE under IDEA, although such a claim was not required.97 But the
court rejected the rigid application of the Fry clues, and held that the
lower court was wrong to suggest that the treatment of the isolated

86. Id. at 552–53.
87. Doucette v. Georgetown Pub. Sch., 936 F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir. 2019).
88. Wellman v. Butler Area Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 125, 132 (3d Cir. 2017).
89. Paul G. v. Monterey Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist., 933 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2019).
90. J.S. III ex rel. J.S. Jr. v. Houston Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 877 F.3d 979, 983–84 (11th Cir.
2017).
91. Patrick v. Success Acad. Charter Sch., Inc., 354 F. Supp. 3d 185, 227–28 (E.D.N.Y. 2018);
Smith v. District of Columbia, No. 16-1386 (RDM), 2018 WL 4680208 at *9 n.1 (D.D.C. Sept. 28,
2018).
92. Houston Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 877 F.3d at 983–84.
93. Id. at 984.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 986.
96. Id. 985.
97. Id. at 986.
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student was only a FAPE denial, and the court made an additional
finding of discrimination beyond IDEA through the stigma placed on
the child in his isolation from his peers.98 The court held that the same
conduct could give rise to claims under the ADA or IDEA but did not
require the parents to exhaust their claims under IDEA first. Instead,
they could circumvent this requirement by seeking relief exclusively
through the ADA.99
On the other end of the spectrum, the Fourth Circuit,100 Fifth
Circuit,101 Sixth Circuit,102 and Eighth Circuit103 have applied the clues
as a rigid test. A district court in the Seventh Circuit also followed the
stricter approach.104 Nelson, an Eighth Circuit case, involved a truant
student who had been absent from school for long periods of time
because of depression and an ovarian condition and who, allegedly, had
been the victim of bullying.105 The student’s family sought from the
school district placement into an online program outside of the district
that would be better equipped to meet the child’s needs.106 The school
denied their request, deciding that there was an acceptable alternative
within the student’s home school district.107 The parents believed this
program was inadequate and brought suit under the Rehabilitation
Act, claiming their child was denied an education because of her
disability.108 The court applied Fry, ruling that the nature of the claim
was a denial of FAPE and that exhaustion was required.109 In its Fry
analysis, the court held that an adult could not have brought the same
suit and that the student could not have raised this issue with a public
library or other public facility.110 The parents argued that the student
could raise claims of discriminatory conduct against a different public
98. Id. at 987.
99. See id. at 986 (holding that the district court erred in analyzing the claim as merely a
FAPE violation).
100. See Z.G. ex rel. C.G. v. Pamlico Cnty. Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 744 F. App’x 769, 779 (4th
Cir. 2018) (treating Fry’s two hypothetical questions as a strict test).
101. See McMillen v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 939 F.3d 640, 646 (5th Cir. 2019) (same).
102. See Sophie G. ex rel. Kelly G. v. Wilson Cnty. Sch., 742 F. App’x 73, 80 (6th Cir. 2018)
(determining that a claim against other public childcare facilities has nothing to do with education,
so it does not constitute the denial of a FAPE).
103. Nelson v. Charles City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 900 F.3d 587, 592 (8th Cir. 2018).
104. See J.P. v. Williamson Cnty. Bd. of Educ. Serv., No. 3:16-CV-879-NJR-DGW, 2018 WL
9651501 at *4–5 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2018) (treating the Fry hypotheticals rigidly).
105. Nelson, 900 F.3d at 589–90.
106. Id. at 589.
107. Id. at 590.
108. Id. at 590–91.
109. Id. at 592.
110. Id.
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facility,111 but the court rejected this contention, noting that Fry did not
contemplate “a high level generality” when applying the clues to
claims.112 The actual relief sought was restoration of a FAPE—here,
transfer of the bullied student to a new school—and the parents had
the option to go through administrative procedures to obtain such relief
under IDEA.113 Thus, the court ruled in favor of the school district
because the family failed to exhaust its claim administratively.114
B. How should we view the complaint: issue by issue or as a whole?
Another issue left open by Fry is whether a reviewing court should
look at each claim individually or at the complaint as a whole to
determine if the thrust of plaintiff’s charge is the denial of a FAPE. The
First,115 Third,116 Fourth,117 and Eighth118 Circuits have answered this
question by examining each claim separately. For example, in Wellman
v. Butler Area School District, a student football player suffered various
head injuries which impacted his academic performance.119 The football
player sought accommodations, such as a rest period during study hall
and extra time to complete assignments, but the school repeatedly
rejected his requests and the boy was forced into home schooling.120
The player and his family sued the school district under the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA for failing to provide him an adequate
IEP.121 The Third Circuit denied his claims, but first opined that Fry
requires examining each claim in the complaint to assess if that claim
was for the denial of a FAPE.122 Why? The Supreme Court could not
have intended for lower courts to analyze the complaint as a whole
because that approach would incentivize plaintiffs to pile on nonIDEA claims to evade the administrative exhaustion requirement.123 In
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 593.
114. Id. at 594.
115. See Doucette v. Georgetown Pub. Sch., 936 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2019) (analyzing the
complaint claim-by-claim).
116. See Wellman v. Butler Area Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 125, 132 (3d Cir. 2017) (endorsing a
claim-by-claim approach).
117. See Z.G. ex rel. C.G. v. Pamlico Cnty. Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 744 F. App’x 769, 779 (4th
Cir. 2018) (analyzing the complaint claim-by-claim).
118. See Nelson v. Charles City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 900 F.3d 587, 592 (evaluating the “claim as
a whole”).
119. Wellman, 877 F.3d at 127–28.
120. Id. at 128.
121. Id. at 129.
122. Id. at 132–33.
123. Id. at 132.
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Wellman, the court determined that each of the plaintiff’s claims arose
from the denial of educational accommodations.124 The plaintiff had
alleged that the school failed to protect him from further physical
injury, and even though football is an extracurricular activity, this claim
nevertheless involved educational services, triggering the exhaustion
requirement.125 Thus, the court evaluated each claim individually to
identify those requiring exhaustion and ultimately determined that all
of them did.
On the other hand, the Fifth,126 Sixth,127 Ninth128 and Tenth129
Circuits have evaluated the nature of the complaint as a whole. For
example, in Sophie G. v. Wilson County Schools, an autistic girl who was
unable to use the bathroom without assistance was denied access to a
subsidized after-school program, because, according to the school, her
lack of toilet training was an issue for program administrators.130 The
child’s parents sued under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, claiming
that she was denied access to this program on the basis of her
disability.131 The child did have an IEP that set out the services she
required, which included trying to make her more toilet independent.132
However, the court held that exhaustion under IDEA was not required
because the after-school program was at best tangential to the goals of
the IEP, as it does not provide educational benefits towards a FAPE.133
In making its determination, the Sixth Circuit did not look at each
claim, but instead looked to the lawsuit as a whole. It noted that the
complaint as alleged never mentioned that the after-school program
had been important to educating the child—thus insulating the suit
from the exhaustion requirement.134 Working through the Fry analysis,
the court referenced “the complaint” instead of “the claim.”135 The
court also looked to a separate due process proceeding the child’s
parent had brought before the instant lawsuit, in which the parents had
124. Id. at 133.
125. Id. at 133–34.
126. See McMillen v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 939 F.3d 640, 645 (5th Cir. 2019)
(“substance and language of McMillen’s complaint”) (emphasis added).
127. Sophie G. ex rel. Kelly G. v. Wilson Cnty. Sch., 742 F. App’x 73, 74 (6th Cir. 2018).
128. See Paul G. ex rel. Steve G. v. Monterey Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist., 933 F.3d 1096 (9th
Cir. 2019) (referencing the complaint to determine what was alleged).
129. MacFarlane, supra note 82, at 549–50.
130. Sophie G., 742 F. App’x at 74.
131. Id. at 75.
132. Id. at 74.
133. Id. at 78.
134. Id. at 79.
135. See id. at 78–79 (“nothing in Plaintiffs’ complaint”) (emphasis added).
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alleged deficiencies in the educational services offered.136 In that
proceeding, they had not requested entry into the after-school program,
which suggested to the court that the program was not related to the
child’s education and was not considered as a remedy to the denial of
a FAPE.137 Thus, the court evaluated the nature of the complaint in its
totality, including arguments made in previous proceedings, finding that
the gravamen of the complaint was not the denial of a FAPE.
C. When damages are sought, does exhaustion still apply?
Another issue with Fry is whether the relief sought determines if
the exhaustion requirement applies. In Fry, the Court decided to “leave
for another day” the question of whether exhaustion applies to suits
seeking non-IDEA remedies.138 This question arises when claims are
brought under multiple statutes and the plaintiff seeks remedies
available under one statute but not another.
The circuits have almost unanimously decided that exhaustion is
still required even when the plaintiff is seeking non-IDEA remedies.139
A Fifth Circuit case, McMillen v. New Caney Independent School
District, is illustrative. In McMillen, a student with autism became very
disruptive as he got older.140 The school decided that he could not be
kept in the classroom for students with disabilities and returned him to
his regular classes.141 Once there, one of his teachers tried to “save him”
with promises of herbal supplements and Christianity.142 After these
efforts failed, she sought to have the child removed from the school; he
was then expelled and arrested.143 Following the child’s arrest and
expulsion, the parents brought suit alleging violations of IDEA, the
Equal Protection Clause, and the Rehabilitation Act.144 The district
court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, and the court of appeals affirmed that dismissal.145 The Fifth
Circuit reasoned that, according to the complaint, the student was
actually looking for more than physical access to the school.146 Instead,
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 80.
Id.
Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 752 n.4 (2017).
McMillen v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 939 F.3d 640, 647 (5th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 643.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 643–44.
Id. at 648.
See id. at 646 (rejecting a claim that the complaint only involved more than physical
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the plaintiff was looking for redress to the educational issues that led
to the student’s expulsion, such as his removal from the disabled class.147
However, the parents also requested monetary damages, which are not
available as a remedy under IDEA.148 The court analyzed this issue, left
open by Fry, and stated that the overwhelming majority of courts
require exhaustion even when seeking remedies unavailable under
IDEA.149 The court noted that although a purely textual analysis cut
against exhaustion, the purpose of IDEA is to allow educators to
address educational failures.150 Thus, even though damages were
requested, the claims were still required to go through IDEA
exhaustion in order to determine if the educational problem can be
resolved administratively first.151
Currently, the only outlier is the Ninth Circuit. Under its
application, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that
exhaustion is not required when monetary damages or other remedies
unavailable under IDEA are sought. In Payne v. Peninsula School
District, a teacher punished an autistic student in class by locking him
in a closet.152 His parents brought suit under IDEA and the
Rehabilitation Act, alleging negligence and a violation of the autistic
student’s IEP.153 The Ninth Circuit agreed that his complaint should not
be dismissed and held that on remand that he should clarify the prayer
for relief for each claim.154 The lower court would then decide if the
relief sought was available under IDEA.155 In reaching its conclusion,
the court affirmed Ninth Circuit precedent that exhaustion was not
required when the remedy being sought was unavailable under
IDEA.156 This case was decided before Fry and does not apply the same
framework. However, the circuit has applied the same rule on damages
to cases arising under IDEA after Fry, and in this case the autistic
student was able to avoid the exhaustion requirement on some of the
claims because of the relief he sought.157 The court reasoned that this is

access to the school).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 647–48.
150. Id. at 648.
151. Id.
152. Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 2011).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 882–83.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 875–76.
157. Id. at 883–84.
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the proper interpretation of the statutory text based on legislative
history, holding other anti-discrimination statutory protections were
not to be dulled when relief was unavailable under IDEA.158 In finding
this, the court noted that there may be some possibility for artful
pleading, such that litigants may add on monetary damages to avoid
exhaustion.159 However, it dismissed this concern, reasoning that such
attempts should be obvious, such as when a plaintiff makes a claim only
permissible under IDEA and simply demands monetary damages.160
IV. FIXING THE PROBLEMS OF FRY AT MULTIPLE LEVELS
Clearly, the Fry doctrine has not been implemented uniformly
across jurisdictions. As a general matter, the Court’s opinion generated
more questions than answers.161 The Court did not articulate a
sufficiently concrete or administrable standard to determine if the
gravamen of the claim is the denial of a FAPE. The Court also left
unanswered whether courts should make this determination on a
claim-by-claim basis or look to the complaint as a whole. Moreover,
whether exhaustion applies when the relief being sought is unavailable
under IDEA is still an open question. Lower courts are unable to
clearly and consistently apply the doctrine.162 Furthermore, this system
is onerous for children with disabilities and their parents to navigate.
As the Court itself acknowledged, “the same conduct might violate
all three statutes.”163 Thus, the Court should take steps to clarify the
Fry doctrine. First, the Court should explicitly state that the “clues” are
not merely suggestions, but rather a mandatory test. This would still
give judges the flexibility to make individualized judgments but would
solidify exactly what must be asked in each case. Next, the Court should
apply the new “clue” test to the complaint as a whole, not claim-byclaim. While some borderline cases could be wrongly forced to exhaust,
this is outweighed by the value of ensuring that parents are not forced
to litigate on two fronts at the same time. Lastly, the Court should adopt
the Ninth Circuit’s position that those seeking relief not available
under IDEA are not subject to exhaustion requirements. This is the
158. Id. at 876.
159. Id. at 879.
160. Id. at 880.
161. See Garda, supra note 15, at 476–77 (arguing that the Court’s method in Fry could have
gone farther in answering legal questions, but largely accepting of the “middle ground” the Court
found).
162. Colker, supra note 79, at 454.
163. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 756 (2017).
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most faithful reading of the text, and it allows children who have been
discriminated against to seek damages—to which they are rightfully
entitled—in court without administrative delay. The procedural hurdles
that disabled children face to secure their rightful educational benefits
are currently too high. It is imperative that the government assure userfriendly administrative procedure so families do not waste time in
duplicative proceedings. After all, children are only students for a short
period of time.
A. Fixing the test
The Supreme Court should articulate clearer standards on the three
primary issues dividing the lower courts. First, the Court’s use of
“clues” instead of a defined standard may have been motivated by a
desire to give the lower courts flexibility to handle each case as it
appears. Undoubtedly, adjudicating cases involving the denial of
educational services and potential discrimination are fact-intensive
inquiries. But flexibility has bled into uncertainty: without adequate
guidance, the lower courts have been attempting to discern what test
should be used for the “gravamen” question. This uncertainty has
caused a schism among the circuits—one that creates confusion and
duplicative litigation for claimants. Under the current formulation, it is
entirely possible that courts could reach wildly different
determinations as to the crux of a claim even under the same set of
facts.
Thus, the Court should take the next opportunity to clarify that the
clues represent a defined legal test, and not just suggestions to point
courts in the right direction. Instead of using the language of “clues”
or hints, it should mandate the lower courts apply these questions to
determine the gravamen of a complaint. In Fry, the Court relied on the
clues and supported them with hypothetical scenarios.164 By specifying
what test must be used, the lower courts would no longer need to rely
on hypotheticals and instead apply the law to the facts at hand. Perhaps
this would soothe Justice Alito’s concerns of lower courts wandering
astray.165
Of course, this would not eliminate every issue created by
exhaustion. The processes set out by the states still take time, so
students may still have to wait for the services they need to secure a

164. Id. at 756–57.
165. Id. at 759 (Alito, J., concurring).
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FAPE. Moreover, each state imposes a different set of procedures, such
that the same set of facts could lead to different results in different
systems. In Houston County, the isolated student could sue under the
ADA because the isolation went beyond simply denying education
benefits.166 But in Wellman, the removal of the football player from the
class to take tests was found to be the denial of a FAPE but not
discrimination.167 Both cases arose in circuits that adopted the same
“clues” analysis but reached different results based on the facts. The
fact that courts reach different results in these cases is not inherently a
problem; however, clarifying the legal test would make it easier for
lower courts to sift through relevant facts and create more consistent
and predictable results. If litigants know what steps the courts are
applying to claims ex ante, like if the two clues of Fry became a test, it
makes formulating strategy more routine and makes the process of
determining a litigation path easier.
In addition to defining the contours of the gravamen test, the Court
should also specify that this test applies to the complaint as a whole,
and not claim-by-claim. In Fry, the language used is “gravamen of the
plaintiff’s complaint”—not of the claim.168 This suggests that the Court
meant to apply the test to the complaint as a whole: The Court could
have used the words “of the claim” if it had intended for a more
detailed approach. Whether the complaint is to be read as a whole or
not dictates the administrative avenue parents will use to vindicate
their child’s rights.169 By applying the test on a claim-by-claim basis,
exhaustion requirements could force parents to bring two suits
simultaneously: one in federal court for their discrimination claim and
another in an administrative proceeding under IDEA for the denial of
a FAPE. Most parents have limited resources so this duplicative system
could be cost prohibitive, or even chill suits completely. In this system,
the court would determine whether the complaint, in its entirety, is
about the denial of a FAPE and thus subject to exhaustion as a whole.
For example, in Nelson, the student with depression who was forced to
attend an online program only brought one claim under the
Rehabilitation Act.170 However, if she had brought a claim under
IDEA, the current system would require her to file separate suits

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

J.S. III ex rel. J.S. Jr. v. Houston Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 877 F.3d 979, 987 (11th Cir. 2017).
Wellman v. Butler Area Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 125, 134–35 (3d Cir. 2017).
Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 756 (emphasis added).
Garda, supra note 15, at 474–75.
Nelson v. Charles City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 900 F.3d 587, 590–91 (8th Cir. 2018).
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simultaneously. The plaintiff in Sophie G. would have needed to bring
separate suits: one in administrative proceedings for her due process
claims, and one in federal court for her ADA claim.171 This exemplifies
how looking at claims separately can force parents to maintain multiple
suits at the same time, which is not feasible for every family with
disabled children. Of course, it is possible that administrative
proceedings might be more efficient than federal court proceedings.
But this does nothing to solve the resource strain faced by parents
engaged in two parallel forums. It is financially burdensome, and also
pulls their energy away from the already full plate of caring for a
disabled child.
Lastly, the Court should only require exhaustion when a party is
seeking relief available under IDEA. Perhaps McMillen provides the
strongest reasoning for this approach, despite a result to the contrary.
There is a strong textual argument to suggest that exhaustion would not
be required when the remedy sought is unavailable under IDEA.172 Per
Section 1415(l) of IDEA, exhaustion is required when a party is
“seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter,” which does
not include monetary damages.173 The exhaustion requirement seems
to apply to only those remedies expressly provided by IDEA. Because
monetary damages are not explicitly available under IDEA, exhaustion
ought not apply. Any claims that are insincere and request damages
merely to avoid exhaustion can be addressed in accordance with the
Ninth Circuit’s method.174 That is, a court can look to previous
proceedings and the history of the pleadings to determine whether a
request for damages has legal merit.175 Any plaintiff that tacks on
monetary damages to the claim for the purpose of avoiding exhaustion
will be required to exhaust administrative remedies if the gravamen of
the claim is addressing the denial of a FAPE.176 Thus, a plaintiff who
uses money damages simply to avoid the exhaustion requirement will
still be required to first pursue administrative relief. On the other hand,
a plaintiff who has a valid case for damages can pursue them in federal
court.
These solutions are by no means comprehensive. For one, applying
171. Sophie G. ex rel. Kelly G. v. Wilson Cnty. Sch., 742 F. App’x 73, 80 (6th Cir. 2018).
172. McMillen v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 939 F.3d 640, 647–48 (5th Cir. 2019).
173. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2018).
174. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (noting that artful pleading to avoid
exhaustion can be stopped by courts).
175. Id.
176. Id.
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the clues as a test still presents problems when the same conduct could
be remedied under IDEA, the ADA, or the Rehabilitation Act, as
Justice Alito warned. And second, Congress is arguably the more
appropriate institution to address these problems. But the value
certainty and uniformity in litigation likely outweigh these lingering
concerns.
B. Understanding the importance of procedure
When accessing legal remedies is confusing and outcomes vary
dramatically across states, injured parties may be dissuaded from
seeking relief altogether. In other words, when procedure is
cumbersome, it unduly burdens plaintiffs’ access to rightful relief. In
short, procedure matters.
In the context of special education, IDEA’s administrative track
was meant to facilitate parents’ access to relief for their children. But
under the current system, parents face legal uncertainty. When the
same claim could be brought under IDEA, the ADA, and the
Rehabilitation Act, uncertainty as to what procedure applies makes
parents’ decision on how to proceed more difficult. The longer it takes
for parents to navigate the courts and administrative processes, the less
time students have to make use of necessary educational services, and
the farther behind they may fall developmentally. Ideally, Congress
would address this issue by providing for a clearer path to relief for
parents of children with disabilities and increasing funding for special
education. In the interim, the courts can make the process for families
easier by clarifying what procedures they need to follow to obtain relief.
Some may argue that this solution falls outside the scope of judicial
power. But courts would be doing something they do every day:
interpreting statutes.
Beyond Fry, one larger way for the Court to fix special education
issues is to raise the standards it sets for schools to meet. In Rowley, the
Court held that Congress had intended for IDEA to be a “basic floor
of opportunity” for students with disabilities.177 Moreover, the Court
decided that services provided by schools must only be “reasonably”
calculated to ensure that students received educational benefits.178 The
Court declined to extend this in Endrew F.179 While educators are

177. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982).
178. Id. at 206–07.
179. Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988, 1001 (2017).
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usually better suited to make decisions about a child’s needs, the low
standard that programs are held to means that, on review, courts can
intervene only if the school was unreasonable in ensuring that a child’s
needs had been met. Another pressing issue in special education is a
lack of funding. When Congress first passed IDEA as an improvement
to the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, it increased
federal funding for the education of students with disabilities. When
IDEA was reauthorized in 2004, Congress increased the share of
funding it contributed to special education under the act from 17.73%
to 40% by 2012.180 But in 2014, funding covered only 16% of the costs,
less than what was covered in 2004.181 Absent legislative intervention,
courts should clarify the process by which relief is obtained.
CONCLUSION
When Senator Tom Harkin celebrated the passage of IDEA in the
Senate in 1989, he imagined that students with disabilities would be
well on their way to becoming productive citizens.182 In many cases,
they have. However, when they have been denied a free appropriate
public education, the Court’s decision in Fry v. Napoleon Community
Schools make it harder for them to realize their legal right.
Fry should not be seen as a completely problematic decision; in
many cases, it allowed parents with non-education based discrimination
claims to go straight to court and to avoid being dragged into
administrative proceedings.183 However, the clues used by the Court to
decide when claims were based on the denial of a FAPE and subject to
administrative exhaustion provided no clarity as to which test
governed, whether it was to be applied claim-by-claim, and whether the
remedy available mattered. The Court could have, and in the future
should, clarify these questions with more concrete standards.
Solving problems in special education will require more attention
from the Court and Congress. In Brown v. Board of Education, the
Court proclaimed “education is perhaps the most important function
of state and local governments.”184 Courts must do more to further the
legislative goals of IDEA and reduce the barriers to relief faced by
disabled children.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Perna, supra note 19, at 565.
Id. at 566.
138 CONG. REC. 29, 833 (1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
Garda, supra note 15, at 459–60.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).

